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Why do women engage in transactional sex? While 
much of the explanation is that sex-for-money pays more 
than other jobs, this paper uses a unique panel dataset 
constructed from 192 self-reported diaries of sex workers 
in Western Kenya to show that women who supply 
transactional sex develop relationships with regular 
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clients, and that these clients send transfers in response to 
negative income shocks. Regular clients are the primary 
source of inter-person insurance that women receive, and 
women report in a separate survey that client transfers are 
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It has long been argued that transactional sex (sex-for money) is one of the main drivers of 
HIV, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2002; Plummer et al. 1991). While it is clear 
that the number of women who earn some income from sex is substantial (Vandepitte et al. 2006; 
Morison et al. 2001), it is difficult to estimate how large the transactional sex market is. This is 
because many women supply transactional sex only occasionally (for example, as a supplement 
to another job) and do not self-identify as sex workers. Moreover, transactional sex can be 
present in many different types of relationships, including marriage (see Swidler and Watkins 
2007 for evidence from Malawi), so that the line between sex workers and other women in 
sexual relationships can often be unclear.
1 When women who supply sex more informally are 
counted in, the size of the market can be surprisingly large: for example, in Busia, Kenya (the 
area in which this study takes place), we estimate that 12.5 percent of the population of adult 
women engage in sex-for-money transactions (Robinson and Yeh 2011).
2  
Why do so many women engage in transactional sex? The primary reason is almost certainly 
that sex work pays much better than other available jobs (Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi 2005; Rao 
et al. 2003; Robinson and Yeh 2011), especially in poor countries in which people are close to 
subsistence. However, while the level difference in average income is clearly important, another 
key consideration is the variability of consumption. In Africa, as in much of the developing 
world, shocks are common, formal safety nets are often missing, and insurance through informal 
systems of gifts and loans is rarely, if ever, complete (Townsend 1994). Consequently, 
                                                 
1. For more on the informal sex market, see Caldwell et al. (1989), Luke (2006), Schoepf (2004), Hunter (2002), and 
Wojcicki (2002). 
2. Busia has an unusually large number of sex workers, as it is a known “hotspot” for commercial sex due to its 
location on the main trucking route from Nairobi, Kenya to Kampala, Uganda. Thus, while commercial sex is 
prevalent in many parts of Kenya, the 12.5% figure is likely much higher than average.  
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individuals often resort to other methods of reducing vulnerability, some of which can be quite 
costly. For instance, people may choose less profitable but less risky investments (Morduch 
1995) or sell productive assets in bad times (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993).  
In this paper, we explore whether transactional sex provides inter-personal insurance in 
addition to a higher income level, and whether such insurance affects the decision of women to 
enter (or continue) in transactional sex. In particular, we are interested in the insurance that sex 
workers receive from “regular” clients. Regular clients differ from “casual” clients in that they 
tend to have longer-term relationships with a particular woman. Over time, women who supply 
transactional sex typically develop relationships with one or more such regulars, and these 
relationships can extend beyond just sex. For instance, some regulars are thought of as akin to 
boyfriends or lovers, and it is not unheard of for women to marry regular clients. 
We examine whether regular clients become part of a woman’s risk-coping network and 
provide insurance through transfers when negative shocks occur. To do this, we utilize a unique 
panel dataset constructed from 192 daily sex worker “diaries.” The diaries were essentially pre-
printed questionnaires that were filled by the women on a daily basis. In the diaries, women 
recorded each transaction that they had with a client, including all of the sexual activities 
performed, the price paid, whether a condom was used, and whether the client was a regular or a 
casual. They also recorded any shocks that they experienced, their income, expenditures, and, 
most important for this paper, the transfers they had given to or received from other individuals.  
To measure this, we asked women to record all the transfers they received from other people, 
whether from regular clients or from anybody else (usually friends or relatives). For transfers 
from regulars, women separately recorded whether the transfer was in cash, for rent, for other 




3 To emphasize to women that this variable was to measure transfers (rather than 
payment for sex), they were instructed to record only gifts that were not tied to sex. In addition, 
this information was collected on a page of the diaries which asked about all the other flows they 
received that day: transfers to/from friends and relatives, bank loans, Rotating Savings and 
Credit Association (ROSCA) payouts, and other sources of income (such as full-time work 
outside of sex work or irregular sources of income like the sale of produce or animal products). 
In total, the dataset includes 19,041 transactions over 12,526 sex worker days. 
We find substantial evidence that client transfers serve a risk-coping purpose. Transfers from 
regulars increase by 67-71 percent on the days around own illness, and by 124-125 percent on 
the days around the death of a friend or relative. Transfers also increase in response to health 
shocks caused by sexually transmitted infections, and on days in which sex workers are asked for 
gifts or loans from friends or family members. In relation to the sizes of the shocks, the amount 
of insurance provided is sizeable. Overall, transfers from regular clients are the primary source of 
inter-person income support that women receive (dwarfing that provided by friends or relatives).  
A potential concern with our approach is that transfers and the price for sexual activities were 
self-reported by women, so that it might be possible that large payments in crisis periods would 
be considered transfers rather than as part of the price. We view this as unlikely in that women 
were explicitly instructed to record only those gifts that were not tied to sex as transfers. In 
addition, the price for a sexual encounter was recorded on the same diary page as details of the 
sexual encounter (in particular the sexual activities performed), while the transfers were recorded 
on a separate page which asked about other sources of inflows and outflows (so that women 
would likely record the price on the appropriate page). However, we carefully check this 
                                                 
3. It was extremely rare for women to report transfers to regular clients. Thus, the insurance relationship 
documented here provides benefits for the sex worker only.   
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possibility by examining whether transfers respond to the sexual activities performed that day or 
to other measures of participation in the sex market. As we discuss further in the discussion of 
the results, we find no evidence for this alternative. 
The results suggest that the insurance provided by clients may (on the margin) induce women 
to enter or remain in the transactional sex market (at least in this part of Kenya). In Kenya, the 
alternative for young women is typically to marry (or cohabitate). To motivate our empirical 
approach, we lay out a simple conceptual framework in which women may either get married 
and earn a relatively low income but receive relatively full insurance from their spouses, or enter 
transactional sex to receive a higher income and rely upon regular clients for insurance. At the 
margin, the decision will depend on: i) the level and risk associated with each type of income; ii) 
the stigma, reputation, and other costs of engaging in sex work; and iii) the insurance that each 
choice provides against unexpected income shocks. As the amount of insurance provided by 
clients increases, transactional sex will become relatively more attractive and the number of 
women who choose to enter the market will rise. 
To test this directly, we would like to have a dataset on a broad cross-section of women, and 
examine whether those facing the most risk (or those who are least able to cope with shocks) are 
most likely to enter the market. We cannot do this, however, as our dataset includes only sex 
workers. To provide some descriptive evidence on this issue, we conducted a survey with a 
separate sample of 99 sex workers in which we asked women to list their reasons for entering or 
staying in the transactional market and for seeing regular clients. Though only suggestive, a 
substantial fraction of women report that access to client transfers are an important reason for 
continuing sex work, and between 87 and 98 percent of women report that they see regular 
clients in part to access transfers. In addition, 98 percent of women report that regular clients are  
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either their primary or secondary source of support in times of need, which supports the diary 
results. 
This study contributes to a literature that documents how underlying exposure to risk affects 
ex ante decision making in developing countries. Other studies have focused on topics such as 
migration (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989) or crop choice (Morduch 1995). Though the specific 
topic of this paper has received relatively little attention in economics, several sociological and 
anthropological studies have suggested that women have multiple partners or develop sexual 
networks for financial support and income security (Swidler and Watkins 2007; Schoepf 2004; 
Hunter 2002). Potentially, our results have important public health consequences, especially for 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, since sex workers regularly have unprotected sex with clients.
4 
This paper represents only one way in which income risk affects the decisions of women 
engaging in transactional sex. In other related papers using the same sample of women, we show 
evidence that women are imperfectly insured against risk and that they substitute to more 
dangerous but better compensated sexual activities in response to a variety of income shocks (in 
order to make up for the income shortfall). This was true in the case of a large, aggregate shock 
caused by the 2007-08 post-election crisis in Kenya (Dupas and Robinson 2010a; Dupas and 
Robinson 2010b) as well as with relative small shocks of short-term household illness (Robinson 
and Yeh 2011). The latter uses the same dataset as in this paper. 
These previous results suggest that client transfers are insufficient to compensate for all 
underlying income risk (and indeed, in this paper we find that client transfers make up only part 
of the shortfall from shocks). However, while client transfers do not completely insure women, 
the transfers are still substantial: we estimate that clients provide 25-26 percent of the shortfall 
from own illness, and about 19 percent for funeral expenses. While this leaves much of the risk 
                                                 
4. See Supplementary Table 1, posted at people.ucsc.edu/~jmrtwo.  
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uninsured, this support still dwarfs support from friends and relatives. Without such insurance, it 
is likely that women would respond more aggressively to these larger shocks by increasing labor 
supply.  
Overall, our research strongly suggests that the provision of more formal risk-coping 
mechanisms (such as health insurance or access to formal savings accounts) would have 
important effects on the decisions that sex workers make – from the entry decision to the day-to-
day decision of whether to use a condom or not. While this is only one study in one part of 
Kenya, such issues may well be relevant in other developing countries in which shocks are 
common and formal safety nets are missing. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out a conceptual framework for 
the decision to engage in transactional sex, Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents 
background information on the women in our sample. Section 5 presents our main results, and 
Section 6 considers some alternative interpretations. Section 7 provides descriptive evidence on 
the role that transfers play in entry into this market, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we present a simple conceptual framework to motivate our empirical work. 
We assume that a woman (indexed by i) can either enter the transactional market to earn a 
certain income   at time t, or she can get married.
5 We assume that   to capture that 
earnings from transactional sex are declining with age. 
The woman’s marriage prospects are determined by the marriage market. Men vary in 
quality: if a woman marries a man at time  , the quality of her husband is indexed by  . If a 
                                                 
5. We do not explicitly consider women who remain single but who do not enter transactional sex (for instance, 
women who work for a wage), but this could be incorporated into our framework.   
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woman marries, she earns a certain income   in every period (which is a combination of 
support from her husband and other income, for instance from the farm or a small business). To 
fix ideas, we do not model this income as varying with age: if a woman marries, her income is 
constant thereafter. For simplicity, we assume that women either work entirely in transactional 
sex or get married and earn income from other sources (and so do not model the intensity of 
work within either sector).
6 
Women are also subject to mean zero, unexpected income shocks  . We assume that the 
distribution of these shocks does not change with age, and does not differ between women that 
work in transactional sex and other women.
7 If women get married, they are relatively well 
insured against these shocks by their husbands. In particular, they receive   in transfers 
when shocks occur (where the indexing by h indicates that some men may provide better 
insurance than others). If women enter the transactional sex market, they get some insurance 
from regular clients, which we denote by   (where the indexing by i indicates that women 
may differ in their ability to elicit support from regulars, for instance if they are particularly 
attractive). For simplicity, we assume that savings technologies are completely unavailable, so 
that consumption equals income in every period.
8  
                                                 
6. We do not consider women who simultaneously work in both sectors, as we are interested largely on the extensive 
margin of transactional sex. In reality, most women who supply transactional sex also receive income from sources 
other than sex work. Modeling this aspect of the market would not qualitatively change our results. 
7. If entering transactional sex increased the frequency or severity of shocks, it would tend to increase the threshold 
income premium to enter the sex market (and so depress entry on the margin). We thank a referee for raising this 
point. 
8. While this is clearly an oversimplification, access to formal savings is in fact quite rare in this part of Kenya 
(Dupas and Robinson 2009). This is true also of sex workers specifically (Robinson and Yeh 2011). Both of these 
previous studies suggest that informal savings balances are very low (too small to cope with most shocks), so it is 
not completely implausible to assume that savings levels are close to zero.  
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If a woman engages in transactional sex in any period, she incurs a fixed cost  . For every 
period she continues to remain in transactional sex, she also incurs a marginal cost  .
9 Given 
this, consumption in any period can be written as 
(1)     
where   is an indicator equal to one if a woman engages in transactional sex. To try to 
approximate the marriage market in Kenya, we assume that while a woman is married, she 
cannot enter the transactional sex market.
10 However, women who enter the transactional sex 
market can leave to marry.
11 However, to match the (at least anecdotal) institutional context in 
Kenya, we assume that the quality of partners available to sex workers is declining in the length 
of time she participates in the market. Formally, this assumption is that   (similarly, 
we assume that such men provide less insurance). These assumptions preclude the possibility 
that some women may enter sex work because they expect to find better partners later.
12 
Simplifying notation such that   can be written as   (and   as  ), we can write 
out a woman’s lifetime utility from entering sex work at time 0 and getting married at any later 
date   as 
(2)     
                                                 
9. These costs could be thought of as stigma costs as in Della Giusta, Di Tommaso and Strom (2008). 
10. While this is not true in all cases, the majority of sex workers are unmarried so we think this is a reasonable 
simplifying assumption in this context. 
11. Many women in this sample report that it is likely that they will marry after entering sex work (Robinson and 
Yeh, 2011), and other research has shown that sex workers in Ecuador and Mexico are as likely to marry as other 
women (Arunachalam and Shah 2008). 
12. This setup differs from the model of Edlund and Korn (2002), which is based on the idea that sex workers cannot 
marry and so must be compensated for their lost marriage market possibilities. While sex work may preclude 
marriage in some settings, it does not do so in Kenya so we choose to model it in this way.  
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for any  . If the woman does not enter sex work at all and gets married in period 0, her 
utility is 
(3)     
To decide whether to enter sex work in period 0, the woman finds the   which maximizes 
(2), and compares her expected utility from entering sex work and marrying at date   to her 
expected utility under (3). Defining   as the   which maximizes (2), in other words, the date 
on which a woman would eventually leave to marry if she were to enter sex work, the condition 
for entry is that  
(4)     
 
A. Entry  
Equation (4) suggests that there will be a threshold cost level   below which women will 
participate in the market. The threshold will be decreasing (and entry will be increasing) in 
income from sex work and will be increasing in income in marriage. Clearly, this income 
difference will likely be the main driver of entry. However, another prediction of this simple 
setup is that if a large shock occurs, and if   is relatively low or if marginal utility is very high 
(for instance, because the shocks bring women close to a subsistence level of consumption), we 
will observe women entering sex work in response to shocks themselves (and indeed, we do find 
some evidence in support of this in Table 7). 
 In this paper, our primary interest is to explore whether the threshold (and thus the number 
of women in the market) is increasing in transfers available from clients. The larger the insurance  
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provided by regular clients, the relatively more attractive sex work becomes. Thus, while any of 
the other factors mentioned above could encourage women to enter the market, on the margin, 
the insurance that clients provide will induce some women to enter who otherwise would not. 
 
B. Continuation and Exit 
Once women have begun supplying transactional sex, the incentive to continue is relatively 
high since the fixed cost has been incurred and because we model partner quality as declining in 
experience in transactional sex. However, some exit is still likely to occur. First, women may 
naturally exit because they get older and their earnings from sex work have declined to the point 
that leaving the market brings higher utility.
13 Second, some women will have entered because 
they incurred severe negative shocks in a previous period, and so they may exit because their 
marriage market possibilities are generally high but they were induced into the market by short-
term shocks. Lastly, and somewhat outside the model, we could allow totally unexpected shocks 
to marriage market possibilities (for instance, if women were to randomly find a very high 
quality partner). 
As with entry, it is evident from the model that exit will be less likely the higher is   (in 
relation to  ). While these transfers will not impede all exit, on the margin they will tend to 
keep women in the market. 
With this motivating framework in mind, the objective of the remainder of this paper will be 
first to test if such insurance is provided in practice, and then to provide some descriptive 
evidence on whether these transfers affect behavior as predicted by the model. 
                                                 
13. Some of these women will exit into marriage, while others will likely be too old to marry. For those who do not 
remarry, we could fit them into our framework by assuming that they earn some fixed base income and receive no 




A. Sample Selection 
  The data for this paper were collected from a sample of women engaging in transactional 
sex in Busia, a semi-urban town in Western Province, Kenya. Busia is a town of 44,196 (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2001) which is located on the Ugandan border, along one of two major 
trucking routes connecting the port city of Mombasa to Kampala, Uganda (via Nairobi). Due to 
its location along this trucking corridor, Busia is a known “hotspot” for transactional sex. HIV 
prevalence is also very high: in 2003 (just before the data for this paper was collected), 
prevalence was estimated at 9.8 percent in the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, 
substantially higher than the national average of 6.7 percent (Central Bureau of Statistics 2004).  
Since sex workers are difficult to identify, we worked closely with the Strengthening 
STD/HIV Control Project in Kenya (SHCP), a Kenyan organization that worked with thousands 
of formal and informal sex workers across Kenya. SHCP identified women and organized them 
into peer groups to provide HIV education and promote behavioral change and condom use. By 
2005, when this study began, SHCP had recruited approximately 400 women into 30 peer 
groups. In order to collect reliable data, we secured the cooperation of each peer group leader, 
and employed SHCP’s district coordinator and one of the peer educators as enumerators.  
As discussed earlier, the line between commercial sex and other, more standard types of 
sexual relationships can be blurry in Kenya, as in much of Africa (since many types of 
relationships have a transactional sex-for-money/services component). For this reason, SHCP 
employed a broad definition of a sex worker: any single, widowed, divorced, or separated 
woman, aged 18 or older, who had multiple concurrent sex partners. Because SHCP was already 
using this definition, we continued to do so in this project. Though such a definition would be  
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inappropriate in other contexts (such as in the US), it worked well for this study - all of the 
women who were selected from this sampling frame did in fact engage in sex-for-money. 
Though SHCP had been relatively successful in enrolling women into their program, it was 
possible that women who joined the peer groups were not representative of the average sex 
worker in the area.
14 To construct as representative a sample as possible, we identified other 
women who met SHCP’s definition of a sex worker but who were not involved in the peer 
groups. To do this, the enumerators visited each peer group and asked members to list all the 
women she knew who fit SHCP’s description of a sex worker, whether they were in a peer group 
or not. After compiling this list, duplicates were eliminated by the peer group educators. The 
resulting “universe” of sex workers we identified for our sampling frame from this method thus 
includes all women in the peer groups as well as all other women identified by any peer group 
member.  
Overall, we identified 1,205 women in this manner. Since the population of Busia Town is 
only 44,196, and assuming that the age distribution of the population fits that of the 2003 Kenyan 
Demographic and Health Survey (in which women aged 15-49 make up 21.9 percent of the rural 
population), we estimate that roughly 12.5 percent of women in Busia earn some income from 
transactional sex.
15 
From this sample frame, we randomly sampled women to participate in the project (stratified 
by the peer group in which they were identified). Initially, we sampled 248 women. Of these, 
seven women refused to participate in the project, and another 49 dropped out before data 
                                                 
14. However, Robinson and Yeh (2011) show that there is no difference in observable characteristics between those 
in the peer groups and other women who supply transactional sex.  
15. Though estimates of the size of the transactional sex market are hard to come by, this figure is higher than that in 
other studies (for instance, Morison et al. 2001 or Venditte et al. 2006). We attribute this in part to the fact that Busia 
is a hotspot for commercial sex within Kenya, and in part because our enumerators (and SHCP) were known and 
trusted by the sex workers in the community. As a result, we were likely able to identify a relatively large 




16 In total, we received useable data from 192 women (77 percent of the 
original sample).  
Overall, the women who appear in our dataset tend to be more informal than would be the 
case of streetwalkers or women who work out of brothels. Most of the women in our sample find 
clients in bars, nightclubs, or hotels, and many see clients in the client’s home (or, less 
frequently, in their own home). The vast majority do not self-identify as sex workers: instead, 
most refer to themselves as “survivors,” women who engage in transactional sex to make money 
to live.  
 
B. Diaries and Other Survey Modules 
The primary source of data we use are daily “diaries” which were kept by the sex workers. 
The diaries were essentially pre-printed surveys with questions on income, expenditures (across 
a number of different categories), and the shocks that were encountered that day. The diaries also 
include details on each encounter with a client, including the specific sexual activities performed, 
the price, and whether a condom was used.
17  
As discussed previously, the main outcome in this paper are the transfers received by sex 
workers from clients. On a separate page from the sexual behavior with clients, women recorded 
all the other sources of in- and outflows that they received in a day. These included gifts and 
loans from friends and relatives, ROSCA payouts, and other sources of income (such as other 
regular work, or irregular income sources such as the sale of livestock or of animal produce). On 
this page, women recorded transfers from clients in four separate categories: cash, rent, 
                                                 
16. In Robinson and Yeh (2011), we find no statistically significant differences in observable characteristics at 
baseline between the 49 women who dropped out and other women. 
17. Some versions of the diaries do not differentiate between unprotected vaginal and anal sex, so we aggregate 
them together in this paper.  
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household expenses, and other in-kind gifts (such as food or clothes). Women were instructed to 
record only those gifts that were not tied to sex on this page. 
Given these instructions, and that the information was recorded on a page separately from 
sexual activities, it is unlikely that women would include payment for sex here. However, it was 
up to the women themselves to record what was cash payment for sex, and what was the transfer, 
and so it is theoretically possible that they did not differentiate between these two sources of 
income. However, as we will discuss later, we test this in several different ways and find no 
evidence that transfers were counted in as part of the price.  
Lastly, in informal qualitative work before starting the diaries, it was extremely rare for 
casuals to send transfers to women (which were not payment for sexual activity). To even know 
a woman to the point of providing transfers, a client must have seen a woman previously and so 
was likely somewhat of a regular in any case. Thus, the diaries include only information on 
regular transfers. Though we have likely measured the majority of transfers from clients in this 
way, to the extent that we miss some transfers from “quasi-regular” clients we will likely 
underestimate the response of transfers to shocks. 
Women were asked to fill in the diaries every day for a period of approximately three 
months. The data collection took place over two separate three month intervals: Round 1 
occurred between October and December 2005, and Round 2 occurred between July and October 
2006.
18  
The main concern with a diary method for data collection is that women may make mistakes 
filling them out, or may get tired or bored. Fortunately, we are confident that the data quality is 
high, for two main reasons. First, before use, the diaries were extensively pre-tested to ensure 
                                                 
18. Most women participated in only one round, but 17 women were selected to participate in both rounds of the 
data collection. Thus we have 209 diaries from 192 women.  
16 
 
that they could be understood and accurately completed by the women, and to make sure that the 
questions were culturally appropriate. Second, to maintain data quality, the enumerators visited 
women on a weekly basis to inspect the diaries and note any problems with them. During these 
visits, they answered questions about the diaries and continued to train women who were having 
difficulty.
19  
There are several important differences between the two versions of the diaries which will 
affect our analysis. First, the Round 2 diaries included information on client characteristics, for 
each transaction. These include the client’s occupation, perceived wealth level, attractiveness, 
and cleanliness. In addition, they include measures of whether the sex worker thought the client 
was at high risk of HIV, whether she thought that the client saw a higher than average number of 
sex workers, and whether the client was circumcised. Unfortunately, these measures are 
somewhat problematic in that they were collected from the sex worker rather than the clients 
themselves, so measurement error is a concern. In addition, recording this level of detail for each 
client was burdensome for women. Consequently, even in the Round 2 data, many observations 
are missing client information.
20  
Finally, to supplement the diary information, we administered a one-time background survey 
which included questions on demographics, asset ownership, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, attitudes 
towards sex work, and related issues. In total, the final dataset includes 192 women, 19,041 
transactions, and 12,526 sex worker days. 
                                                 
19. Since the diaries were self-filled, it was necessary for women to be literate to complete them. Although the 
majority of the sample is literate, we also made an effort to keep illiterate women in the sample. Every illiterate 
woman sampled for the project was visited by her peer educator once a day to help her fill out the diary. 
20. An important complication this causes is that while we know whether a particular client is a regular or casual, 
we are not able to match client-specific activities across days.   
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C. Regular and Casual Clients 
This paper focuses on transfers received from regular clients. Before discussing the results, it 
is helpful to discuss what we mean by the term “regular” client in this context. In general, 
regulars have a longer-term relationship with a particular woman, whereas casuals might only 
have a single encounter. Regular clients are also much more likely to buy items or pay expenses 
for women (like helping with rent or paying for clothes). In fact, in an environment in which a 
transactional sex-for-money component exists in many relationships (Swidler and Watkins, 
2007), some regulars are thought of as essentially boyfriends or lovers.  
Overall, regulars tend to have closer relationships with women, outside of a specific 
transaction. That said, though women are familiar with the general terms “regular” and “casual,” 
the distinction between them is not always sharp. For this reason, we allowed women to 
determine for themselves which clients were regulars and which were casuals. The goal of the 
rest of this paper will be to examine the extent to which the regular client relationship extends to 
providing informal insurance. 
 
IV. Background Statistics 
A. Background Statistics (Women) 
Summary statistics for the women in the sample are presented in Table 1. Panel A presents 
averages across the 192 women in the sample from the background questionnaire. The average 
woman in our sample is 28 years old, started seeing clients at 19, and is fairly well educated for 
rural Kenya (average educational attainment is 9.2 years, and 95 percent of women can read 
Kiswahili). The majority (84 percent) of women are the heads of their households, and the 
average woman has three dependents.  
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Panels B and C present averages from the daily diaries. The average woman makes almost 
700 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) from sex work, which was equivalent to about $10 during the sample 
period and which is roughly 4-5 times that of other female daily income earners in the area 
(Dupas and Robinson, 2009). Also of note from Panel B is that women see a client on 76 percent 
of days and see about 1.5 clients per day. Roughly one-third of these clients are regulars. Despite 
the substantial risk of HIV in this area, unprotected sex is also common: women have 
unprotected sex on 18 percent of all days and have an average of 0.42 unprotected sex acts per 
day (including the 24 percent of days in which they do not participate in the transactional sex 
market). 
Finally, Panel C highlights how vulnerable women are to health and other shocks. Women 
report having a sick household member (where sickness is an indicator equal to one if a person 
experiences cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts or burns, or other illness) on 37 percent 
of days, own sickness on 34 percent of days, and report having an STI on 3 percent of days. 
Women are also frequently asked for money by friends or relatives (on 7 percent of days). 
Finally, the biggest shock of all is also unfortunately quite common: women report the death of a 
friend or relative on 4 percent of days.  
To examine shocks over a somewhat longer time period, Column 2 shows the probability of 
experiencing a shock over a week. Own and household sickness are experienced on 60 percent of 
weeks, and the death of a friend or relative occurs on 14 percent of weeks. Similarly, Column 3 
shows the percentage of women that experienced these shocks at least once over the three month 
sample period – as expected, the percentages are quite high for all shocks. This is an 




B. Background Statistics (Clients) 
Table 2 presents background statistics on the clients of sex workers. In this Table, Column 1 
gives the overall average for each variable, Column 2 gives the mean among regulars, Column 3 
the mean among casuals, and Column 4 reports a p-value for the test that the means for regulars 
and casuals are equal. Interestingly, though it is well documented that long-distance truckers are 
major consumers of commercial sex (Orubuloye et al., 1993, World Bank 2009), and even 
though Busia is located on a major trucking route, it turns out that the majority of clients come 
from other professions. While 18 percent of clients are truck drivers, another 28 percent are 
government employees, 20 percent are businessmen or other salaried workers, and the remainder 
are distributed between shop owners, bicycle taxi drivers, and salaried workers in other 
occupations. The distribution of jobs is similar between regular and casual clients, though 
casuals are somewhat more likely to be shop owners. 
Also of particular interest are the percentages of men whom the sex worker thinks are at high 
risk of HIV/AIDS. Thirty-four percent of regulars and 51 percent of casuals are judged to be at 
high risk. Given the HIV prevalence of 9.8 percent around the survey period, this suggests that 
both types of clients are very risky, though regulars less so. It should be noted, however, that this 
question was left blank by many women, so that we only have 1,952 observations for this 
variable (of the 4,195 observations with any client information).  
The rest of the Table reports the means for the questions about the client’s perceived wealth, 
attractiveness, and the frequency with which the client has unprotected sex (with all of his sexual 
partners). Casuals are somewhat richer but seen as less attractive than regulars. There are no  
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significant differences in the question about unprotected sex, suggesting again that regulars are 
quite risky sexual partners as well.  
 
V. Results 
A. Shocks and Client Transfers 
The first goal of this paper is to test whether client transfers serve a risk-coping function. We 
implement this by running the following fixed effects regression: 
(5)     
In this setup,   is the sum of all the transfers a woman received on a particular day,
21   are 
measures of shocks and   are controls for participation in the transactional sex market (the 
number of clients she saw, and various measures of sexual behavior).   are individual fixed 
effects,   are date controls (dummies for the month and the day of the week), and   is an error 
term.
22 
We focus on three types of shocks in this paper: (1) the illness of a family member (as 
discussed above, illness includes fever, flu, cough, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts and burns, 
and other illnesses); (2) the illness of the respondent; and (3) the death of a friend or relative. For 
robustness, we also examine two other shocks in the appendix: whether the sex worker was 
asked for a loan from a friend or relative, and whether the sex worker was suffering from the 
symptoms of an STI.  
In our regressions, we include controls for sexual behavior   to control for the fact that 
                                                 
21. This variable is the sum of all transfers from all regulars that she interacted with on a given day. Thus this 
measure includes those regulars who never send transfers. We are unable to tell if there are clients who never send 
transfers since we do not have a useable client ID in the database. Anecdotally, however, there are clients who never 
send transfers. 
22. We perform robustness checks in which we examine weekly averages with similar results. Since the daily data is 
directly comparable to our companion paper Robinson and Yeh (2011), and is more directly interpretable and 
cleaner, we focus on that measure in this paper.  
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transfers may be directly related to the provision of sexual activities (however, as we will show 
in the robustness section, the relationship between transfers and the provision of sexual services 
is, at most, weak), and because we know from previous work that women increase their labor 
supply in response to negative shocks so that shocks and labor supply will tend to be correlated. 
Overall, if client transfers do in fact serve a risk-coping purpose, we would expect to find that 
.
23 
Since client transfers may not increase on the very day of the shock, we include indicators for 
whether a shock occurred that day, whether a shock had occurred the day before, and an 
interaction between the two (regressions including more lags look similar but are omitted for 
space). The results are presented in Table 3. Columns 1-3 include indicators for whether a shock 
was experienced that day, while Columns 4-6 also include indicators for whether the shock was 
experienced the day before. For each set of shocks, the columns differ  in the labor supply and 
sexual activity controls they include: Columns 1 and 4 do not include any controls, Columns 2 
and 5 include controls for the number of regular and casual clients that the woman saw, and 
Columns 3 and 6 include detailed activity con trols. These controls include whether the woman 
engaged in vaginal, anal, and oral sex, whether she gave the client a massage, whether she kissed 
the client, whether she provided company, whether she stripped for the client, and whether she 
provided any other services. Lastly, we control for whether the woman had unprotected sex with 
the client.
24  
In Panel A, we examine household and own illness. The results are very consistent across 
                                                 
23. Some sexual activity controls are missing for some observations. To avoid dropping these observations, we 
generate dummies for whether the activity is missing, code the activity as 0, and include the dummies in the 
regressions. 
24. The diaries do not include information on the number of times the woman engaged in each type of sexual 
activity. Instead, we only know whether she engaged in the activity with a client or not (for instance, we know if the 
woman kissed a particular client, but not the number of times). For this reason, all sexual activity measures are sums 
of dummy variables – they give the number of clients with whom she engaged in the given activity at least once in a 
day (rather than the total number of repetitions across all clients).  
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specifications, and show that transfers increase by 21-27 Ksh on days in which the sex worker is 
sick. These estimates understate the total amount transferred, since clients do not always make 
the transfer on the day of the illness: from Columns 4-6, transfers are also 26-27 Ksh higher on 
the day after a sex worker was ill. However, the client seems to make a transfer only once: the 
interaction sick today * sick yesterday is negative and of the same size as the sickness dummies. 
Thus, clients transfer more on the first day of an illness and the day after a woman recovers from 
an illness, but they do not transfer more on the second day of an illness if she is sick for multiple 
days. In total, for an illness that lasts one day, women get about 51-54 Ksh in transfers from 
clients in the days around an illness, a result that is highly statistically significant (see p-value at 
the bottom of the panel). Since average daily transfers are 76 Ksh on days in which a woman 
does not encounter any shock (Table 3, top row), transfers increase by 67-71 percent of an 
average day’s transfers when a woman falls sick.
25 
Interestingly, client transfers respond more strongly to the larger shock of the death of a 
friend or relative. Funeral expenses are a very sizeable shock in Kenya, as they are elsewhere in 
Africa (for instance, see Case and Menendez,  2009 for evidence on the effect of funerals on 
South African households). While point estimates vary somewhat across specifications, transfers 
are 62-65 Ksh higher on the day a friend or relative dies, and 32-33 Ksh higher the day after. In 
total, transfers increase by around 124 percent of an average day’s transfer. Unfortunately, due to 
the imprecision of our estimates (due to the rarity of funerals and to the fact that we only asked 
about this shock in Round 2 of the diaries), only the coefficients in Columns 1-3 are significant 
at 10 percent. In Columns 4-6, the sum of the coefficients has a p-value between 0.14 and 0.16. 
While the results for sickness and the death of a friend or relative are our strongest findings, 
                                                 
25. In Appendix Table 1, we take the average of each dependent variable over a week and regress average daily 
transfers on the average of the shocks. The results look very similar. We take the average of each variable rather 
than the sum because some variables are missing on some days.  
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we present some supporting evidence in Appendix Table 2. Here, we present results for being 
asked for a gift or loan, and for experiencing the symptoms of an STI. The results paint a similar 
picture, though with considerably less precision than our earlier results (especially for being 
asked for a gift/loan, since this shock was only measured in Round 2 of the diaries). While the 
results do not achieve significance, the coefficients are positive, and relatively large. While only 
speculative, we view these results as generally supportive of our main results.
26 
The one shock which is not at all insured is illness of other family members. While we do not 
have a good explanation for this, one possible reason is that own sickness and funeral expenses 
are more easily observable and verifiable by the  client. Women might be able to ask clients for 
help only with those types of shocks, and must deal with household health shocks on their own. 
This explanation is at best speculative, however. 
 
B. How Big Are the Transfers? 
In this subsection, we try to quantify how big these transfers are in terms of the size of the 
shocks incurred. To do this, we run similar fixed effects equations as Equation  (5), but with 
income, expenditures, and transfers as dependent variables (without any controls other than the 
day of the week and month of the year). The results are presented in Table 4.
27 
We start with own sickness - when women fall sick themselves, it serves as a shock in two 
ways: they must spend money t o treat the illness, and they are unable to work. Taking the 
example of a one-day illness, women lose about 82 Ksh in labor income on the day of the illness 
and make about 27 Ksh more on the day after an illness. They spend an extra 104 Ksh on the day 
of the illness and an extra 47 Ksh the day after. Thus, in total, women lose about 55 Ksh in labor 
                                                 
26. Results look similar at the weekly level – see Supplementary Table 2, posted at people.ucsc.edu/~jmrtwo. 
27. These estimates differ slightly from Robinson and Yeh (2011) because we restrict our regressions to 
observations with complete data on all expenditures, income, and transfers.  
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income and spend 151 Ksh more, so that the total shortfall is around 206 Ksh. From Table 3, 
client transfers increase by 51 Ksh on the days surrounding the illness, so clients insure about 25-
26 percent of the total.
28 While this is only a fraction of the shock, it is larger than the support 
provided by friends and family (Column 5), which (insignificantly) increases by only 35 Ksh on 
such days. 
Support is also significant in the case of funeral expenses (Panel B). Funerals are probably 
the biggest shock facing people in rural Kenya  –  for  a  one  day  funeral,  total  expenditures 
increase by about 503 Ksh (465 Ksh on the day of the funeral and 38 Ksh the day after)
29 Clients 
transfer about 95-96 Ksh for such shocks, or about 19  percent of the total.
30 Transfers from 
others are 18 Ksh, representing a net outflow, most likely due to funeral contributions.   Though 
not reported here, a similar pattern is observed in the cas e of being asked for money or 
experiencing an STI. 
It is interesting to note that funerals are partially insured by clients, since women do not work 
more in response to funerals (in fact, from Table 4, they work somewhat less on such days, 
perhaps because they are attending the funeral or wake).
31 Apparently, women are able to rely on 
clients for some support with such shocks, and so are less obligated to work more to pay for the 
expenses.  
Equally apparent, however, is that much income risk remains uninsured by clients (and from 
other insurance networks as well). While the transfers make up some of the money required to 
deal with these emergencies, they fall far short of full insurance. Consequently, women must also 
                                                 
28. For all shocks, expenditures do not change significantly on the day after the shock is experienced. 
29. Note that we code funeral expenses as expenditures instead of transfers to the family of the deceased. 
30. A similarly large response is found when aggregating at the weekly level – see Supplementary Table 3, posted at 
people.ucsc.edu/~jmrtwo. 
31. In previous work, we also find that women do not substitute to riskier sexual activities in response to funerals 
(Robinson and Yeh 2011).  
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supplement these transfers by increasing their labor supply in response to shocks (which we have 
explored in prior work).  
 
VI. Alternative Hypotheses 
In  this  section,  we  consider  an  important  alternative  hypothesis  for  our  results:  that  the 
transfers  that  clients  send  are  actually  directly  tied  to  sexual  or  other  services  provided  by 
women, so that they should be seen as part of the price that regular clients pay. That is, the 
concern is either that what we code as transfers are in fact payments for sexual activities, or that 
the contract for regulars involves a “discount” at the time of the transaction but that regulars are 
obligated to provide state-dependent transfers later on. This seems unlikely since we controlled 
for sexual activity controls in our regressions in Table 3, but we provide two further pieces of 
evidence against this hypothesis in this section: (1) the level of client transfers is at most weakly 
correlated with sexual activities or participation in the transactional market and (2) regular and 
casual  clients  pay  statistically  indistinguishable  prices  for  sexual  activities,  even  when 
controlling for background characteristics of the clients. 
 
A. Transfer Levels Are Not Correlated with Sexual Activities 
We first document that transfers from regulars are not strongly correlated with labor market 
participation, which suggests that they should be thought of as transfers rather than as payments. 
To examine this, we run the following regression, at the daily level: 
(6)     
In the equation,   are transfers from regular clients to sex worker   on day  , and   is a vector 
which includes various measures of participation in the transactional sex market. The regression  
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includes individual fixed effects   and date controls   (the day of the week and the month of 
the year), as well as controls for the round of data collection. In all regressions, the standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level. The coefficient of interest is  : if transfers are not tied 
to sexual behavior, then   should be near 0.  
Results are presented in Table 5. From the bottom of the table, women receive 102 Kenyan 
shillings on average in client transfers (US $1.46) on days in which they see no clients.
32 Moving 
across the table, Column 1 includes a dummy for whether the woman saw any clients, Column 2 
includes the number of clients seen, Column 3 includes the number of regular and casual clients 
seen separately, and Column 4 includes detail on the specific sexual activities performed.
 33  
In Columns 1 and 2, we find no evidence that transfers are higher on days in which women 
see  clients;  if  anything,  transfers  are  slightly  lower  on  days  in  which  a  woman  supplies 
transactional  sex,  and  on  days  when  she  sees  more  clients,  though  both  coefficients  are 
insignificant. That transfers do not depend on whether a woman sees a client is a strong piece of 
evidence to suggest that transfers are not implicit payment for sex. 
In Column 3, we find a small, statistically insignificant increase in transfers on days in which 
women see more regulars, but a small decrease when she sees more casuals (which is significant 
at 10 percent). Since the transfers we consider in this paper are exclusively from regular clients, 
the small negative coefficient on the number of casual clients is almost surely due to sampling 
variation.  In  any  case,  both  coefficients  are  very  small:  seeing  an  additional  client  affects 
transfers by seven or eight shillings, which is a small percentage of daily transfers (102 Ksh per 
                                                 
32. The number of clients is defined as the number a woman saw that day, rather than the “stock” of regulars she 
has. We are unable to measure the latter. While we asked women to keep an ID number for each of her regulars in 
the second round of diaries, this data was kept very incompletely so we do not know how many regulars a woman is 
seeing at any point in time. 
33. Since transfers come exclusively from regular clients, we could instead control only for activities with regular 
clients. Doing this yields very similar results.  
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day). Since women see an average of 0.54 regular clients and 0.98 casual clients in a normal day, 
the magnitudes of these coefficients are not large. 
Finally, in Column 4, we examine the specific sexual activities provided by women. Most 
activities are insignificant, though several are not: kissing and unprotected sex are positively 
correlated with transfers, while vaginal sex is negatively correlated. In interpreting the positive 
unprotected sex coefficient, note that the vast majority of unprotected sex acts are unprotected 
vaginal sex (Robinson and Yeh 2011), so that in most cases the unprotected sex and vaginal sex 
coefficients  should be added together (yielding  a small, statistically insignificant  increase of 
about 4.2 Ksh associated with unprotected vaginal sex). Thus, while unprotected anal sex is 
associated  with  higher  transfers,  this  is  a  rare  event  (occurring  on  2  percent  of  days  –  see 
Robinson and Yeh 2011). Similarly, the kissing coefficient is not large, since women kiss only 
0.92 clients on an average day. Overall, the results from Column 4 suggest that sexual activities 
have at most a weak effect on client transfers.
 Though we do not report the coefficients here, we 
also find that the response of transfers to shocks is similar even on days in which women see no 
clients, suggesting again that the transfers are not crowding out payments for sexual activities. 
Finally, we also find no evidence that transfers change in the days following a shock, so it is not 
the case that the transfers simply substitute payment for sex intertemporally.
34 
An alternative way to test that transfers are not related to sexual activity would be to create a 
dependent variable which is the sum of income and transfers, and examine how this sum varies 
with shocks. There are several problems with this, however, since labor supply is endogenous to 
the shocks – from Table 4, women work less when they are sick and when a friend or relative 
dies, so that income will tend to go down on days when shocks occur. We could in principle 
account for this by including labor supply measures as controls, but this will not work well if 
                                                 
34. See Supplementary Table 4 for results at the weekly level, posted at people.ucsc.edu/~jmrtwo.  
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there are unobserved aspects of labor supply which we do not have in our dataset and which are 
correlated with both shocks and income (such as a woman’s mood on a certain day, or the 
amount of time she spends with a client). In a regression of income on shocks, the existence of 
such omitted variables will tend to bias coefficients downwards. Indeed we find just this: even 
when controlling for labor supply, income goes down on shock days.
35 For this reason, the sum 
of income and transfers does not respond significantly to shocks.  
In light of our other evidence, however, it seems that the most likely interpretation for this 
result is that several important unmeasured dimensions of labor supply are omitted. 
 
B. Regulars and Casuals Pay Similar Prices 
Even though transfers are not correlated with activities, it still might be the case that regular 
clients pay a lower price for sexual activities and repay through later transfers . To test this, we 
run hedonic price regressions in Table 6, in which we regress the price paid on various sexual 
activities, along with interactions between those activities and whether the client is a regular. 
These regressions take the following form: 
(7)     
In this equation,   is the price for transaction r for woman i at date t.   are controls for 
the specific activities which the women engages in with a client.   is an indicator for whether 
the client in transaction r is a regular or a casual, and   is an individual fixed effect.   is a date 
control, and   is a normally distributed error term. 
In this regression,   measures the premium to a particular sexual activity for casuals, and   
represents  the  difference  in  premia  between  regulars  and  casuals.  If  these  differences  are 
                                                 
35. Note that this is not because women change the prices they charge in response to shocks - see Appendix Table 3.  
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negative and significant, it is possible that transfers are compensation for lower payments for 
sexual activities. If, however, the  s are close to 0, then it is unlikely that transfers are implicit 
compensation for sexual activities.  
In  Table  6,  Column  1  presents  Equation  (7)  without  the  interaction  terms,  but  with  an 
indicator for whether the client is a regular, while Column 2 includes the interaction terms. 
Column 3 presents the p-value for the test that the coefficient for regulars is equal to that for 
casuals, for each activity. As can be seen from the last coefficient in Column 1, conditional on 
activities performed, regulars pay insignificantly different prices than casuals – the coefficient on 
the regular dummy is insignificant and small. From Column 2, the premia to each activity is 
similar for both types of clients. If anything, regulars pay more for oral sex and “other activities”. 
However, the regular coefficient is now negative and significant at 10 percent. To test whether 
the coefficients are jointly significant, we perform an F-test for the joint significance of all the 
interactions  and the regular coefficient. The  p-value of this  test  is  0.20, suggesting minimal 
differences in activity-specific premia. 
One possible concern with these results is that regulars and casuals may differ in various 
background characteristics (even though Table 2 shows small differences in observables). We 
check this by including client characteristics (occupation, tribe, cleanliness, attractiveness, and 
whether the client is circumcised) as controls in these regressions, and find similar results.
36 
However, these results should be taken with some caution since we only asked for client 
information in the second round of diaries and, even in that round, many women neglected to fill 
this information. Consequently, there are  few observations with client information, and the 
subsample with this information is not random. That caveat in mind, we find no evidence that 
transfers  are  compensation  for  sexual  activities:  while  regulars  are  more  likely  to  have 
                                                 
36. See Supplementary Table 5, posted at people.ucsc.edu/~jmrtwo.  
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unprotected sex than casuals, they pay just as much for this as do casuals. Thus, the explanation 
for these results does not appear to be that regulars are implicitly paying for higher-risk sex 
through these transfers. 
Why then do clients become regulars, if they do not receive a discount on the price and if 
they are obligated to make state-dependent transfers to women? While we did not interview 
clients to ask this question, there are several likely reasons. First, as sex work is technically 
illegal in Kenya, there are few brothels in this area. Instead, men will often meet sex workers at 
bars or nightclubs. Doing this may be costly – a client has to physically go to the location, spend 
money on food and drinks, negotiate with the sex worker, and there is some risk he cannot find a 
woman to his liking. Thus, having a relationship with a woman who he can simply call on the 
phone might save on transaction costs and minimize the risks of not finding a woman on a 
particular evening. Second, men might prefer a certain “type” of woman, or the personality of a 
particular woman. One of the main services sex workers provide is to provide company, and so 
men will likely value those women with whom who they enjoy spending time. For either reason, 
becoming a regular may bring benefits (even if he is then obligated to send her transfers). 
 
VII. Access to Client Transfers and Participation in Transactional Sex 
Our primary interest in these results is the extent to which they affect the decisions that 
women make to enter or remain in transactional sex, particularly in an environment with frequent 
and costly shocks. Unfortunately, our dataset is not well suited for answering this question: in a 
perfect world, we would have a long panel on a large, representative sample of women, and 




However, since our dataset consists exclusively of women already engaging in transactional 
sex, the most that our analysis can show is evidence of transfers providing an insurance function 
for  women  already  in  the  market.  To  provide  some  evidence  on  the  decision  to  enter 
transactional sex, we conducted a short survey in April and May 2010. As it had been several 
years since we had conducted the diaries (and many women had moved, left sex work, or died), 
we surveyed a separate sample of 99 women. These women are currently active in the peer 
groups,  and  are  similar  in  age  and  in  experience  in  transactional  sex  to  the  women  who 
participated in the diaries. It is important to note that these women were not randomly selected 
and all of them participate in the peer groups.
37 
In the survey, we asked women questions about why they entered sex work originally, why 
they continue in sex work, and why they see regular clients. We also asked q uestions about 
whether they expect help from regular clients, and whom they most rely upon in times of need. 
To avoid influencing responses, we asked each question in two ways: (1) by asking the questions 
in an open-ended way and coding all responses that were given, and (2) by reading the woman a 
list of all possible responses and checking those to which she responded yes.  The unprompted 
questions were always read first. 
The results are presented in Table 7. The  top of the  Table reports responses to  questions 
about motivations for entering sex work. As expected, the income premium to sex work is cited 
by the vast majority of women: 79  percent of women report this  as a  reason even when not 
prompted, and 100 percent do when prompted. Also of interest, however, is that between 78 and 
99 percent of women report that they entered because they encountered an adverse shock and 
needed the income to cope with it. Smaller but significant percentages of women report love or 
looking for a husband as reasons for entry. 
                                                 
37. Apart from age and experience, we did not collect detailed demographic information from these women.  
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Turning to the questions about why women choose to remain in transactional sex, all women 
cite the income premium. A sizeable fraction of women also cites support from regular clients: 
between  21  percent  (unprompted)  and  97  percent  (prompted)  of  women  report  access  to 
insurance through clients as a reason for staying in the market. This motivation is substantially 
larger than that of love or finding a husband. 
The evidence is even stronger when women are asked directly why they see regular clients 
specifically.  Help  with  shocks  is  the  primary  reason  listed.  This  is  a  much  more  common 
response than that it is more enjoyable to spend time with regulars, that regulars are at less risk 
of being HIV positive, or that regulars pay more.  
Panel B provides some evidence against the alternative hypothesis that women enter sex 
work to find a husband. While the average woman in this subsample has 2.37 clients, she reports 
having no chance of marrying 1.32 of these. In addition, all women in this sample report that 
they expect help from regulars when shocks occur, even those whom they have no chance of 
marrying.  
Finally, in Panel C, we asked women for the primary sources they use for coping with risk. 
Ninety-eight percent of women report that clients are either the primary or secondary source used 
for risk-coping, a  figure  far  greater than any other source (transfers from  friends or family, 
working more, or using savings). This is reassuring in that it closely parallels our findings from 
the diaries. 
 
VIII. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In previous work, we have shown that income risk has important effects on the intensive 
margin for sex workers: when shocks occur, women are more likely to increase the amount of  
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sex they have, and switch to riskier but better paying activities (Robinson and Yeh 2011; Dupas 
and Robinson 2010a; Dupas and Robinson 2010b). In this paper, we present additional evidence 
that vulnerability to income risk also affects the extensive margin to enter and continue in the 
transactional market. In particular, we have shown that sex workers develop relationships with 
regular clients, and that regular clients become one of the primary sources of insurance that 
women can rely upon when shocks occur. Women report access to these transfers as an 
important reason for engaging in transactional sex. 
Taken together with our previous work, our results strongly suggest that programs to reduce 
vulnerability to income risk can have large effects. For instance, access to health insurance or to 
subsidized health inputs could substantially lessen the magnitude of health shocks, and could 
reduce incentives to find regulars to help with such occurrences. Individual savings accounts 
could also potentially reduce vulnerability by allowing women to save securely in anticipation of 
shocks.  
Of course, as long as there exists a large income premium to sex work, many women will 
always be willing to engage in transactional sex, so reducing vulnerability to risk will not 
eliminate the transactional sex market. However, policies to reduce income and consumption risk 
will make it less likely that women who enter are those who have recently been hit with negative 
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Panel A. Background Information
Age 28.43
(6.98)




Literacy Read Kiswahili Write Kiswahili
0.95 0.88
Respondent is Head Of Household 0.84
Total # of Dependents 2.96
(2.36)
Respondent is in a Peer Group 0.44
Number of Regular Clients (at time of  2.24
  background survey) (1.07)
Marital Status
Widowed 0.23
Divorced / Separated 0.20
Cohabitating 0.13
Never Married / Not Cohabitating 0.44
Observations 192
Panel B. Labor Supply in the Sex Market (Daily Averages)
Participated in Sex Market 0.76
Total Income from Sex Work 686.84
(749.55)
Total Income from All Sources 788.26
(778.89)
Number of Clients Seen 1.52
(1.12)
Number of Regular Clients Seen 0.54
(0.66)
Had Unprotected Sex 0.18
# of Times Unprotected Sex 0.42
(1.10)
Observations 12526
Number of Women 192
Occurred at Least
Prob.of Occurring Once over 3 Month
Daily Average in a Week Sample Period
Panel C. Shocks (1) (2) (3)
Someone in Household Sick (other than respondent) 0.37 0.60 0.93
Respondent Sick 0.34 0.60 0.98
A Friend or Relative of Respondent Died 0.04 0.14 0.46
Respondent was Asked for Money 0.07 0.23 0.70
Respondent had STI 0.03 0.08 0.34
Observations 12481 2384 209
Number of Women 192 192 192
Notes: Figures in Panel A are averages across the 192 women in the sample, from a background survey.
Figures in Panels B and C are daily averages from self-reported diaries.
There are more observations than IDs in Panel C, Column 3 because 17 women took part in 2 rounds of diaries.
Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household or respondent reported having a cough, fever, malaria,
typhoid, diarrhea, cuts or burns, or any other illness. 
The exact number of observations differ for some variables due to missing values.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the sample period.
Standard deviations in parentheses.Table 2. Client Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Regular Casual p-value for 
Clients Clients Clients regular = casual
Occupation
     Truck Driver 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.78
     Government Employee 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.41
     Businessman / Salaried Workers 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.32
     Shop Owner 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.02**
     Bicycle Taxi Driver 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.19
     Works in Bar / Restaurant / Hotel 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.72
     Other 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.41
Sex Worker thinks Client is at High Risk of HIV/AIDS
1 0.38 0.34 0.51 0.40
Sex Worker Rates the Client's Wealth as:
     Above average 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.01***
     About average 0.40 0.43 0.33 0.11
     Below average 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07*
Sex Worker Rates the Client as:
     Handsome 0.57 0.63 0.44 0.01***
     About average attractiveness 0.36 0.31 0.48 0.01***
     Below average attractiveness 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.72
Sex Worker Thinks the Clients Has Unprotected Sex:
2
     More often than average client 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.60
     About as much as average client 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.49
     Less often than the average client 0.38 0.40 0.31 0.25
Number of Observations 4195 2968 1204
Number of Women
Notes: Averages are sex worker reports from daily diaries. Client data is only available for a
portion of the data.
The number of observations in Column 1 does not equal the sum in Columns 2 and 3 because
client information is missing for some observations.
The p-values in Column 4 are from regressions with sex worker fixed effects.
Standard errors in those regressions are clustered at the individual level.
The exact number of observations differs from variable to variable due to missing values.
1Response to the question on HIV risk is non-missing for only 1952 respondents. 
The rest were coded as "don't know" or were left blank.
2The question about unprotected sex is the total amount of unprotected sex the woman thinks
the client has, with all of his sexual partners.
108Table 3. Shocks and Transfers from Regular Clients (Daily)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Dependent Variable
1
Panel A. Household Sickness
Household Sickness
Somebody in Household (other than -10.79 -10.16 -11.34 -2.48 -2.67 -3.06
   respondent) Sick Today (8.43) (8.42) (8.42) (12.15) (12.13) (12.20)
Somebody in Household (other than 3.35 3.66 3.56
   respondent) Sick Yesterday (12.11) (12.13) (12.12)
Somebody in Household Sick  -14.69 -13.82 -14.76
  Today * Sick Yesterday (16.45) (16.39) (16.53)
Own Sickness
Respondent Sick Today 22.07 21.28 20.83 26.73 25.78 25.02
(7.59)*** (7.76)*** (7.75)*** (12.36)** (12.35)** (12.32)**
Respondent Sick Yesterday 27.02 26.25 26.27
(11.37)** (11.37)** (11.26)**
Respondent Sick Today * -29.11 -28.65 -28.23
   Respondent Sick Yesterday (17.24)* (17.32)* (17.30)
# of Regular Clients Seen 6.60 6.23
(7.02) (7.39)
# of Casual Clients Seen -8.74 -10.10
(4.70)* (4.76)**
Detailed Sexual Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 12154 12154 12154 11148 11148 11148
Number of Women 192 192 192 192 192 192
p-value for somebody in HH sick today + - - - 0.19 0.22 0.17
  somebody in HH sick yesterday = 0
p-value for respondent sick today + - - - 0.01*** 0.02** 0.03**
  respondent sick yesterday = 0
Panel B. Death of a Friend or Relative
Death of a Friend or Relative Today 62.47 61.40 63.90 63.09 62.01 64.54
(34.34)* (34.45)* (34.44)* (41.95) (42.22) (42.14)
Death of a Friend or Relative Yesterday 32.51 32.88 32.27
(35.25) (35.35) (35.03)
Death of a Friend or Relative Today *    -2.23 -2.28 -0.28
   Death of a Friend or Relative Yesterday (83.92) (83.66) (83.49)
# of Regular Clients Seen 6.23 7.10
(9.77) (10.39)
# of Casual Clients Seen -9.66 -10.12
(7.58) (7.73)
Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 7385 7385 7385 6681 6681 6681
Number of Women 190 190 190 190 190 190
p-value for death today + - - - 0.16 0.16 0.14
  death yesterday = 0
1Mean of Dependent variable is mean when all shocks equal 0.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the sample period.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
76.10
Dependent Variable: Gifts from Regular Clients
Notes: All variables are measured at the daily (rather than client) level, as we are not able to match client-
specific transfers to client-specific activities. Regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the day 
of the week and the month of the year. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Sickness is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or 
other illnesses. Sexual activity controls include vaginal sex, anal sex, oral sex, kissing, massage, stripping, 
whether the women gave a client company, whether the woman had unprotected sex, and whether she 
engaged in any other activities. All sexual activity variables measure the number of clients with whom the 
woman engaged in the given activity at least once, since we did not record the number of repetitions for all 
activities. 
Sexual activities were missing for some women. To avoid dropping them from the regressions, we code the 
activity as 0 and generate dummies for whether the activity is missing.
See text for more details. Table 4. Income and Other Risk-Coping Mechanisms (Daily Shocks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Income Total Total Medical Net Gifts + Loans
from Sex Work Income Expend. Expend. Friends &
Relatives
Mean of Dependent Variable
1 663.34 751.86 429.11 13.23 -18.40
Panel A. Household Sickness
Household Sickness
Somebody in Household (other than 37.45 45.57 121.92 23.92 -11.19
   respondent) Sick Today (28.35) (28.47) (24.07)*** (4.81)*** (12.50)
Somebody in Household (other than 36.72 39.52 50.19 6.98 5.35
   respondent) Sick Yesterday (26.81) (28.24) (21.54)** (3.45)** (9.08)
Somebody in Household Sick  -11.71 -17.77 -140.15 -12.43 0.28
  Today * Sick Yesterday (40.21) (40.63) (31.71)*** (6.66)* (17.61)
Own Sickness
Respondent Sick Today -81.84 -81.73 103.59 43.08 -16.91
(25.46)*** (26.88)*** (22.07)*** (5.69)*** (12.04)
Respondent Sick Yesterday 27.18 23.04 46.67 6.75 -17.97
(24.18) (24.90) (18.05)** (2.87)** (8.98)**
Respondent Sick Today * -46.17 -47.48 -120.91 -28.75 27.59
   Respondent Sick Yesterday (37.63) (40.92) (30.23)*** (6.32)*** (14.59)*
p-value for sum of household health 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.001*** 0.46
  shocks = 0
p-value for sum of own health 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.13 0.001*** 0.29
  shocks = 0
Observations 11148 11148 11148 11148 11148
Number of Women 192 192 192 192 192
Panel B. Death of Friend or Relative
Death of a Friend or Relative Today -65.74 -62.64 464.95 7.12 3.86
(67.20) (68.78) (69.85)*** (9.56) (21.45)
Death of a Friend or Relative Yesterday -25.68 -24.92 37.93 -1.99 13.69
(48.04) (48.88) (39.36) (5.94) (17.81)
Death of a Friend or Relative Today * -262.18 -256.64 0.55 -8.27 12.14
   Death of a Friend or Relative Yesterday (160.86) (167.54) (154.90) (17.37) (34.49)
p-value for sum of shocks = 0  0.03*** 0.05*** 0.001*** 0.82 0.19
Observations 7385 7385 7385 7385 7385
Number of Women 190 190 190 190 190
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions (at the daily level) with controls for the day of the week and the 
month of the year. Standard errors (clustered at the individual level) in parentheses. Sickness is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if respondent reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other illnesses. 
Transfers are negative for inflows and positive for outflows. Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US 
$1 during the sample period.
1Mean of Dependent variable is mean when all shocks equal 0.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5. Transfers and Sexual Activities (Daily Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex Worker Saw at least 1 Client -11.57
(10.08)
# of Clients Seen -3.74
(4.68)
# of Regular Clients Seen 6.95
(7.05)
# of Casual Clients Seen -8.14
(4.63)*
# of Clients Vaginal Sex
1 -13.86
(5.75)**
# of Clients Anal Sex 1.35
(5.83)
# of Clients Oral Sex -4.64
(5.03)
# of Clients Manual Stimulation -2.95
(6.32)
# of Clients Massage -1.28
(5.97)
# of Clients Kissing 8.04
(4.69)*
# of Clients Giving Company 7.40
(4.75)
# of Clients Stripping -1.47
(5.22)
# of Clients Sex in Thighs -1.37
(7.16)
# of Clients "Other" Activities 5.46
(18.27)
# of Clients Unprotected Sex 18.06
(7.27)**
Activity Controls No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
2
Observations 12460 12460 12460 12460
Number of Women 192 192 192 192
Notes: These are fixed effects regressions (at the daily level) with controls for the day of the 
week and the month of the year. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in
parentheses. 
1This variable measures the number of clients with whom the woman had vaginal sex
at least once in a given day. It is not the total number of times she had vaginal sex that day, 
since we did not collect information on the number of sex acts per client for all activities in all 
diary versions. All sexual behavior variables are coded in this manner. See text for more details.
2Mean is for days on which woman does not see clients.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the sample period.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Gifts from Regular Clients (Daily)
102.21Table 6. Prices and Sexual Activities by Client Type
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Price Paid p-value for
interaction term
Vaginal Sex 24.21 7.58
(25.10) (27.59)
Vaginal Sex * Regular 57.44 0.18
(42.50)
Anal Sex 77.19 72.34
(20.93)*** (21.65)***
Anal Sex * Regular 16.77 0.52
(26.04)
Oral Sex 23.68 6.20
(15.06) (15.14)
Oral Sex * Regular 52.32 0.1*
(31.40)*
Manual Stimulation 48.60 39.60
(15.79)*** (14.95)***
















Stripping * Regular 27.54 0.23
(22.84)
Sex in Thighs 34.87 48.24
(15.68)** (18.49)***
Sex in Thighs * Regular -40.74 0.17
(29.27)
"Other" Activities 58.58 18.80
(33.41)* (27.08)
"Other" Activities * Regular 92.37 0.08*
(52.08)*
Unprotected Sex 42.33 33.60
(16.45)** (19.98)*
Unprotected Sex * Regular 23.72 0.43
(30.19)
Regular Client -16.64 -89.75
(14.69) (49.32)*
p-value for F-test that "regular"  0.20
  coefficient and all interaction 
  terms are jointly insignificant
Mean of Dependent Variable 453.40 453.40
Observations 18824 18824
Number of women 192 192
R-squared 0.04 0.05
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and the day of 
the week.  Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. All regressions 
include controls for the round of data collection. The dependent variable is Kenyan shillings. 
The exchange rate was approximately 70 Kenyan shillings to $1 US during the data 
collection period.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7. Self-Reported Reasons to See Regulars and Engage in Sex Work
(1) (2)
Panel A. Self-Reported Reasons Unprompted
1 Prompted
2
Self-Reported Reasons for Entering Sex Work
   Love / Bodily Desire 0.02 0.41
   To Find a Husband 0.07 0.36
   Income Premium 0.79 1.00
   Encountered Adverse Shock 0.78 0.99
Self-Reported Reasons for Continuing Sex Work
   Love / Bodily Desire 0.04 0.58
   To Find a Husband 0.12 0.61
   Income Premium 1.00 1.00
   Regular Clients Provide Help with Shocks 0.21 0.97
Self-Reported Reasons for Seeing Regular Clients
   Love / Bodily Desire 0.33 0.86
   To Find a Husband 0.31 0.78
   They Pay More 0.09 0.71
   They are Less Trouble 0.07 0.37
   They are at Less Risk of HIV 0.01 0.02
   It is More Enjoyable Spending Time with Regulars 0.07 0.29
   They Can Help with Shocks 0.87 0.98
Panel B. Information about Regular Clients (1)
Number of Regular Clients 2.37
(1.07)
Number of Regular Clients with a Good Chance to 0.73
  Marry (0.47)
Number of Regular Clients with no Chance to 1.32
  Marry (0.81)
Do You Expect Help from Regular Clients 1.00
   when Shocks Occur?
Do You Expect Help from Regular Clients Whom  1.00
   You Have no Chance of Marrying when Shocks Occur?
(1) (2)
Panel C. Risk-Coping Primary Secondary
Regular Clients 0.70 0.28
Friends / Family 0.13 0.45
Working More 0.10 0.12
Savings 0.07 0.14
Observations 99
Notes: Figures are averages from a short survey conducted in April-May 2010
with a sample of 99 women. Standard deviations in parentheses. In Panel B, the omitted
category is those clients with whom the woman has an intermediate chance of marrying. 
1"Unprompted" responses are coded responses from open-ended questions.
2"Prompted" responses are responses when women were read a list of possible
reasons, to which they could respond yes or no.
The unprompted questions were always asked first.
Self-Reported Sources Used
for Risk CopingAppendix Table 1. Shocks and Transfers from Regular Clients (Weekly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Dependent Variable
1
Panel A. Household Sickness
Household Sickness
Proportion of Days Somebody in HH 5.21 5.54 6.79 -5.21 -4.98 -6.05
   other than respondent) Sick This Week (18.96) (18.52) (18.92) (25.86) (25.77) (26.21)
Proportion of Days Somebody in HH -1.91 -1.46 -3.89
   other than respondent) Sick Lastk Week (21.36) (21.22) (21.29)
Prop. Days Somebody in HH Sick Last Wk * 6.28 6.25 6.63
 Prop. Days Somebody in HH Sick This Wk (41.76) (41.40) (41.54)
Own Sickness
Proportion of Days Respondent Sick 58.82 58.81 56.62 38.47 38.25 38.54
  This Week (20.62)*** (20.62)*** (21.16)*** (22.35)* (22.42)* (22.36)*
Proportion of Days Respondent Sick 33.89 33.02 30.57
  Last Week (19.29)* (19.53)* (19.85)
Prop. Days Respondent Sick This Week * 7.42 7.86 7.88
  Prop. Days Respondent Sick Last Week (46.21) (45.99) (46.68)
Ave. # of Regular Clients Seen 12.74 12.91
(23.21) (20.45)
Ave. # of Casual Clients Seen -2.70 -5.86
(10.68) (8.88)
Detailed Sexual Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2344 2344 2344 2116 2116 2116
Number of Women 192 192 192 192 192 192
p-value for Prop. Days somebody in HH sick  - - - 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02**
  this week + Prop. Days last week = 0
p-value for Prop. Days respondent sick  - - - 0.97 0.99 0.89
  this week + Prop. Days last week = 0
Panel B. Death of a Friend or Relative
Proportion Days in which there was  130.67 131.96 134.09 102.03 102.94 103.19
  Death of a Friend or Relative This Week (86.22) (86.68) (83.53) (69.97) (70.72) (69.99)
Proportion Days in which there was  2.09 3.60 3.62
  Death of a Friend or Relative Last Week (41.49) (41.65) (40.26)
Prop. Days Death this week *    -101.70 -101.98 -116.38
  Prop. Days Death Last Week (90.44) (88.72) (94.89)
Ave. # of Regular Clients Seen 16.90 20.20
(33.40) (30.11)
Ave. # of Casual Clients Seen -4.42 -5.24
(16.07) (12.08)
Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1532 1532 1532 1320 1320 1320
Number of Women 190 190 190 190 190 190
p-value for Prop. Days death this week + - - - 0.97 0.94 0.89
  Prop. Days death last week = 0
1Mean of Dependent variable is mean when all shocks equal 0 over the week.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the sample period.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
72.03
Dependent Variable: Average Gifts from Regular Clients
Notes: All variables are means aggregated over a week. Regressions are fixed effects regressions with month fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Sickness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondent 
reports a cough, fever, malaria, typhoid, diarrhea, cuts, burns, or other illnesses. Sexual activity controls include vaginal 
sex, anal sex, oral sex, kissing, massage, stripping, whether the women gave a client company, whether the woman had 
unprotected sex, and whether she engaged in any other activities. All sexual activity variables measure the number of 
clients with whom the woman engaged in the given activity at least once, since we did not record the number of 
repetitions for all activities. 
Sexual activities were missing for some women. To avoid dropping them from the regressions, we code the activity as 0 
and generate dummies for whether the activity is missing.
See text for more details. Appendix Table 2. Shocks and Transfers from Regular Clients for Other Shocks (Daily)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean of Dependent Variable
1
Panel A. Respondent was Asked for a Gift or Loan
Respondent was Asked for  24.26 24.25 24.81 47.05 46.84 47.97
   a Gift or Loan Today (18.62) (18.57) (17.80) (29.45) (29.10) (28.41)*
Respondent was Asked for  21.71 21.24 20.33
   a Gift or Loan Yesterday (26.38) (26.58) (26.39)
Respondent was Asked Today * -57.05 -57.47 -58.28
   Respondent was Asked Yesterday (77.07) (76.12) (76.45)
# of Regular Clients Seen 5.37 6.02
(11.47) (12.22)
# of Casual Clients Seen -6.02 -7.80
(8.73) (8.78)
Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 5465 5465 5465 4929 4929 4929
Number of Women 108 108 108 108 108 108
p-value for asked for gift/loan today + - - - 0.84 0.86 0.86
  asked for gift/loan yesterday = 0
Panel B. Respondent had an STI
Respondent had an STI 19.52 17.02 16.88 82.39 78.22 78.72
   Today (21.90) (21.97) (22.25) (54.17) (54.01) (54.58)
Respondent had an STI 53.21 53.93 53.34
   Yesterday (30.37)* (30.52)* (29.85)*
Respondent had an STI Today * -135.64 -135.17 -135.55
  Respondent had an STI Yesterday (69.81)* (69.20)* (69.93)*
# of Regular Clients Seen 6.49 5.77
(7.03) (7.35)
# of Casual Clients Seen -8.71 -10.04
(4.69)* (4.75)**
Activity Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 12321 12321 12321 11330 11330 11330
Number of Women 192 192 192 192 192 192
p-value for STI today + - - - 1.00 0.89 0.87
  STI yesterday = 0
1Mean of Dependent variable is mean when all shocks equal 0.
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Kenyan shillings to US $1 during the sample period.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Gifts from Regular Clients
76.10
Notes: All variables are measured at the daily (rather than client) level, as we are not able to match client-
specific transfers to client-specific activities. Regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the 
day of the week and the month of the year. Sexual activity controls include vaginal sex, anal sex, oral sex, 
kissing, massage, stripping, whether the women gave a client company, whether the woman had unprotected 
sex, and whether she engaged in any other activities. All sexual activity variables measure the number of 
clients with whom the woman engaged in the given activity at least once, since we did not record the number 
of repetitions for all activities. Sexual activities were missing for some women. To avoid dropping them from 
the regressions, we code the activity as 0 and generate dummies for whether the activity is missing. See text 
for more details. Appendix Table 3: Prices and Shocks
(1) (2)




Death of a Friend or Relative -72.38
(107.87)
Vaginal Sex 69.41 43.55
(30.66)** (35.19)
Vaginal Sex * Somebody in HH -35.37
  Sick (42.80)
Vaginal Sex * Respondent Sick -62.05
(39.64)
Vaginal Sex * Funeral 33.50
(83.67)
Anal Sex 89.49 147.49
(26.77)*** (37.47)***
Anal Sex * Somebody in HH -5.06
  Sick (33.85)
Anal Sex * Respondent Sick -23.18
(37.11)
Anal Sex * Funeral 50.74
(71.00)
Oral Sex 26.66 47.76
(19.16) (22.49)**
Oral Sex * Somebody in HH -6.22
  Sick (23.57)
Oral Sex * Respondent Sick 3.92
(19.60)
Oral Sex * Funeral 128.87
(74.59)*
Had Unprotected Sex 43.83 75.14
(22.11)** (25.09)***
Had Unprotected Sex * Somebody in HH 7.65
  Sick (27.84)
Had Unprotected Sex * Respondent  -9.16
  Sick (22.18)




Regular * Somebody in HH -5.18
  Sick (25.50)
Regular * Respondent  12.19
  Sick (25.20)
Regular * Funeral -52.19
(40.41)
p-value for joint sig., HH sickness interaction terms 0.37
p-value for joint sig., own sickness interaction terms 0.13
p-value for joint sig., funeral interaction terms 0.54
Mean of Dependent Variable 453.71 531.66
Observations 18504 10331
Number of women 192 190
R-squared 0.05 0.05
Note: All regressions are fixed effects regressions with controls for the month and the day of 
the week.  Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. All regressions 
include controls for the round of data collection. The dependent variable is Kenyan shillings. 
The exchange rate was approximately 70 Kenyan shillings to $1 US during the data 
collection period. Regressions include several other measures of sexual behavior, but the 
coefficients are omitted for space. These include providing company, massage, stripping, 
sex in thighs, manual stimulation, and other activities. The p-values listed at the bottom of 
the table test for the joint significance of all the interaction terms (including those that are 
omitted for space).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Price Paid